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EYES ONLY

6 April 1954

FGW

Agree to

hold up

Action on

this morning

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

~~PBSUCCESS~~; proposed further survey by

copy sent line

1. You asked me yesterday afternoon to give consideration to the possible desirability of our requesting [] to take one more trip to the area concerned to look over the plan, examine the degree of progress and state of readiness and report back his conclusions as to the likelihood of success. At our regular weekly ~~SUCCESS~~ meeting today this proposal was presented and carefully gone over by all present, including [] Our conclusions are as follows:

2. It should be remembered that [] participated in the earlier phase in which an entirely different plan was in contemplation. Moreover, he more or less lent his stamp of approval to the earlier plan. The present plan will be completely new to him and because of its employment of more subtle and technical paramilitary and psychological methods may not appeal to him in view of his background as a regular Marine officer. It is possible that he might conclude that the plan itself was inadequate and that the resources are not sufficiently visible. Such a conclusion would introduce an element of confusion into the entire project and would unquestionably have adverse effects upon certain of the key members of the team, who might well conclude that we were re-examining the entire approach and were about to reverse direction again. At this extremely critical stage of the operation this could be very damaging.

3. The foregoing are put forward as adverse considerations for your examination, and not as representative of a definite negative recommendation concerning some further use of []

[] is recognized by all who know him as an outstanding officer with a splendid record of service in the Marine Corps. If we were running anything like a straight line military operation there would be no question as to the value of his advice and recommendations. The question arises, however, in the context of the present plan. We simply do not know whether he has the turn of mind or possesses a sufficient degree of flexibility of thinking to adapt and orient himself to this plan. One way of finding this out, before letting him go to the area of operation, would be to have him go to LINCOLN for a week or ten days and there be exposed to a full and detailed briefing concerning the aspects of this plan. At the end of this period of briefing we

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could judge pretty well just how useful, viz., constructive, the
dispatching of [] to the field would prove to be.

4. We would appreciate receiving your reactions to the foregoing.

[]
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WH

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